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Abstract: The consensus reaching process (CRP) is a dynamic and iterative process for improving 
the consensus level among experts in group decision making. A large number of non-cooperative 
behaviors exist in the CRP. For example, some experts will express their opinions dishonestly or 
refuse to change their opinions to further their own interests. In this study, we propose a novel 
consensus framework for managing non-cooperative behaviors. In the proposed framework, a 
self-management mechanism to generate experts’ weights dynamically is presented and then 
integrated into the CRP. This self-management mechanism is based on multi-attribute mutual 
evaluation matrices (MMEMs). During the CRP, the experts can provide and update their 
MMEMs regarding the experts’ performances (e.g., professional skill, cooperation, and fairness), 
and the experts’ weights are dynamically derived from the MMEMs. Detailed simulation 
experiments and comparison analysis are presented to justify the validity of the proposed 
consensus framework in managing the non-cooperative behaviors. 
Keywords: Group decision making, consensus reaching process, self-management mechanism, 
non-cooperative behaviors 
1. Introduction 
Group decision making (GDM) [29, 63] can be viewed as a task to find a collective solution 
to a decision problem in situations in which experts express their opinions regarding multiple 
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alternatives. Usually, at the beginning of the GDM problem, the experts’ opinions may differ 
substantially. The consensus reaching process (CRP) is often a necessity to achieve a general 
consensus regarding the selected alternatives in GDM [21, 24]. Classically, consensus is defined 
as the full and unanimous agreement of all experts regarding all possible alternatives. However, 
this definition is inconvenient and complete agreement is not always necessary in real life. This 
belief has led to the use of a “soft” consensus level (i.e., consensus measure) [7, 8, 26, 30, 31, 39, 
56]. Based on a “soft” consensus level, different types of CRPs have been proposed: (i) CRPs 
under different preference representation formats [10, 13, 15, 17, 28, 35, 55]; (ii) CRPs with 
minimum adjustments or cost [5, 6, 12, 16, 22, 23, 66, 68, 69]; (iii) CRPs based on consistency 
and consensus measures [18, 20, 25, 54, 67]; (iv) CRPs that consider the attitudes of experts [38, 
45]; (v) CRPs under dynamic/Web contexts [1, 2, 32, 43, 65]; (vi) CRPs based on trust or experts’ 
weights [4, 42, 53]. 
In GDM problems, a large number of non-cooperative behaviors exist. For example, some 
experts will express their opinions dishonestly or refuse to change their opinions to obtain their 
own interests. Hence, it is necessary to address non-cooperative behaviors to ensure the quality of 
the GDM results. In the extant literature, Pelta and Yager [41] and Yager [59, 60] investigated the 
non-cooperative behaviors that are called strategic manipulation behaviors and occur in the 
aggregation function that is used in the selection process of GDM problems. Recently, Palomares 
et al. [40] proposed a consensus model for addressing non-cooperative behaviors in the CRP of 
GDM problems, in which the weights of the experts who have the non-cooperative behaviors are 
compulsively penalized by a moderator. Although these approaches are very useful they still need 
to be further improved to cope with non-cooperative behaviors in real-world GDM problems 
because (1) in the works of Pelta and Yager [41] and Yager [59, 60], the non-cooperative behaviors 
are considered solely in the selection process of GDM problems and are not considered in the CRP 
and (2) in the work of Palomares et al. [40], the management of the non-cooperative behaviors is 
heavily dependent on a moderator and is occasionally excessively demanding for the moderator. 
Therefore, the objective of this study is to propose a novel consensus framework based on a 
self-management mechanism to manage non-cooperative behaviors in the CRP. In this novel 
consensus framework, the experts provide not only preference information about alternatives but 
also mutual evaluation information for experts. The mutual evaluation information is given by 
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means of multi-attribute mutual evaluation matrices (MMEMs). We propose an 
optimization-based approach to obtain the experts’ weights from the MMEMs. Furthermore, the 
obtained experts’ weights are integrated into the CRP. During the CRP, the experts not only 
modify their preference information about alternatives to achieve a consensus but also modify 
their MMEMs regarding experts’ performances (e.g., professional skill, cooperation, and fairness). 
We propose detailed simulation experiments and a comparison analysis to justify the validity of 
the proposed consensus framework in managing non-cooperative behaviors. 
The proposal with the self-management mechanism can be applied to address 
non-cooperative behaviors in the CRPs of practical GDM problems. When an academic 
conference committee wants to select a best paper or a science foundation committee hopes to find 
outstanding projects to support, some committee members may adopt non-cooperative behaviors 
to obtain their own interests; thus, the committees are confronted with the need to manage 
non-cooperative behaviors. The proposal provides a self-management mechanism to help the 
committees cope with the non-cooperative behaviors by using the means that the committee 
members provide and update their MMEMs in the multiple rounds of discussion. 
The remainder of this study is arranged as follows. Section 2 introduces preliminaries. Then, 
Section 3 describes the consensus-based GDM with non-cooperative behaviors, and proposes the 
resolution framework. Next, we apply the proposed consensus framework to manage 
non-cooperative behaviors in Section 4. Following this, in Section 5, an illustrative example is 
provided. Finally, concluding remarks are included in Section 6. 
2. Preliminaries 
This section introduces the basic knowledge regarding the ordered weighted average (OWA) 
operator, the additive preference relations (also called fuzzy preference relations), and the 
selection process to obtain the ranking of alternatives, which provide a basis for this study. 
For a GDM problem, let 1 2{ , ,..., }nX x x x  ( 2)n   be a finite set of alternatives and 
1 2{ , ,..., }mE e e e  ( 2)m   be a set of experts. When experts express their opinions about 
alternatives, the preference representation formats are popular techniques. There are several 
different preference representation formats, including: utility functions [51], preference orderings 
[47], multiplicative preference relations [46, 48], additive preference relations [27, 36, 51], and 
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linguistic preference relations [14, 44, 50]. Herrera-Viedma et al. [28] discussed the 
transformation functions among different preference representation formats. In this study we 
assume that experts provide their opinions about alternatives by means of additive preference 
relations. 
(1) OWA operator 
Let 
1 2
{ , ,..., }
N
c c c  be a set of values to aggregate. The OWA operator [57] is defined as 
                    1 2 1( , ,..., )  .
N
N k kk
OWA c c c b

                       (1) 
where kb  is the k th largest value in 1 2{ , ,..., }Nc c c , and 1 2( , ,..., )
T
N     is an 






In [58], Yager suggested an effective method to compute 1 2( , ,..., )
T
N     using 
linguistic quantifiers, which, in the case of a non-decreasing proportional quantifier Q  [64], is 
given by the following expression:  
1( ) ( )i ii N NQ Q
  , 1,2,...,i l ,                     (2) 
where ( )Q c  can be represented as 
                     
0  ,  ,
( )  ,  ,
1  ,  ,
c a
c a









                          (3) 
with ,  ,  [0,1]a b c .  
There are several common linguistic quantifiers, such as all, most, at least half and as many 
as possible, where the parameters ( , )a b  are (0,1) , (0.3,0.8) , (0,0.5)  and (0.5,1) , 
respectively. When a linguistic quantifier Q  is used to compute the weights of the OWA operator, 
it is symbolized by QOWA . 
(2) Additive preference relations 
Definition 1: Additive preference relations [36, 51]. A additive preference relation on a set of 
alternatives 1 2{ , ,..., }nX x x x  is represented by a matrix ( )ij n nP p  , where [0,1]ijp   
denotes the preference degree of the alternative ix  over jx . An additive preference relation 
usually assumed to be additive reciprocal, i.e., 1ij jip p  , ji, . 
For simplicity, we call the additive preference relations the preference relations in this study. 
Let 1 2( , ,..., )
T
nPr pr pr pr  be the preference vector over alternatives X  derived from the 
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preference relation ( )ij n nP p  , where 0ipr   is the preference value of the alternative ix . In 
this study, the quantifier-guided dominance degree iQGDD  is used to quantify the preference 
value of the alternative ix  as follows [28]: 
                 1 2, , ,i i Q i i inQGDD OWA p p ppr   .                    (4) 
(3) Selection process in GDM 
The selection process which is used to obtain the ranking of alternatives from a group of 
preference relations consists of two phases [28]: aggregation and exploitation. 
1) Aggregation phase 
Let 
( ) ( )( )c cij n nP p   be a collective preference relation obtained by means of the 
aggregation of the individual preference relations 
( ) ( )( )k kij n nP p   ( 1,2,..., )k m . The 
weights average (WA) operator and OWA operators are most widely used in GDM problems. This 
study integrates the experts’ weights into the CRP; thus, we use the WA operator to implement the 
aggregation operation as follows: 
( ) (1) (2) ( ) ( )
1
( , ,..., )
m
c m k
ij ij ij ij k ij
k
p WA p p p p

                       (5) 






2) Exploitation Phase 
Let ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2( , ,..., )
c c c c T
nPr pr pr pr  be the collective preference vector over alternatives X  
derived from the collective preference relation 
( ) ( )( )c cij n nP p  , where 
( ) 0cipr   is the 
collective preference value of the alternative 
ix . Based on Eq. (4), we can obtain 
( )c
ipr , i.e.,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2, , ,( )
c c c c c
i i Q i i inQGDD OWA p p ppr   .                  (6) 
Based on 
( )cPr , the collective ranking of the alternatives X  can be obtained. 
3. Consensus-based GDM with non-cooperative behaviors  
This section describes the consensus-based GDM problem with non-cooperative behaviors, 
and then proposes its resolution framework. 
3.1. Decision problem and proposed framework 
(1) Decision problem 
As noted in Section 1, a large number of non-cooperative behaviors exist in the CRP. Here, 
we propose the consensus-based GDM problem with non-cooperative behaviors as follow: 
Let 1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }mE e e e  ( 2)m   be a set of experts, 1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }nX x x x  ( 2)n   be a 
set of alternatives, and 
( ) ( )( )k kij n nP p   ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m  be a preference relation provided by 
the expert ke .  
In the CRP, some experts may adopt non-cooperative behaviors to obtain their own interests. 
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The question is how to help experts achieve a consensus in the GDM context with 
non-cooperative behaviors. 
(2) Proposed framework 
Solving GDM problems follows a common resolution scheme composed by two different 
processes (or models) [24, 28]: consensus and selection. The consensus process includes two parts: 
consensus measure and feedback adjustment. By integrating the experts’ weights generated 
dynamically into the consensus process, we propose a novel consensus framework. The 
implementation of the novel consensus framework addresses a three-process procedure. The 
































Process of generating experts-weights
Consensus process
 
Fig. 1. Framework for GDM with non-cooperative behaviors 
1) Process of generating experts’ weights 
In the CRP, the experts provide and update their MMEMs regarding the experts’ 
performances (e.g., professional skill, cooperation, and fairness). Then, an optimization-based 
approach is proposed to obtain the experts’ weights from the MMEMs. 
The process used to generate experts’ weights is introduced in Section 3.2. 
2) Consensus process 
The objective of the consensus process is to improve the consensus level among the experts. 
The implementation of this consensus process involves a two-step procedure: 
(i) Consensus measure 
In this step, a consensus measure method that incorporates experts’ weights is introduced to 
measure the consensus level among the experts.  
(ii) Feedback adjustment 
Based on consensus measure, the feedback adjustment rules are used to help experts modify 
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their preference information to improve the consensus level among experts. 
The details of the consensus process are introduced in Section 3.3. 
3) Selection process 
Once the consensus among experts is achieved, the selection process introduced in Section 2 
is employed to derive the collective final ranking of alternatives.  
3.2. Process of generating experts’ weights 
In this section, we propose an optimization-based method to obtain the experts’ weights from 
the MMEMs. 
In the CRP, the experts provide and update their MMEMs based on multiple attributes (e.g., 
professional skill, cooperation, and fairness). Let 1 2{ , ,..., }lA a a a  ( 1)l   be a set of attributes 
in the MMEMs. Let 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T







 . Let ( ) ( )( )k kij m lV v   ( 1,2,..., )k m  be a MMEM, where 
( )k
ijv  denotes the 
evaluation value that the expert ke  assigned to the expert ie  with respect to the attribute ja . In 
this study, we assume that 
( ) [0,100]kijv   for i k  and 
( )k
ijv null  for i k . 
 Transform 
( ) ( )[ ]k kij m lV v   
( 1,2,..., )k m  into normalized ( ) ( )[ ]k kij m lV v   by using the 


































 ( i k ), for cost attribute ja , 1, 2,...,j l           (8) 
( )k
ijv null  ( i k ), for attribute ja , 1, 2,...,j l                         (9) 
Let 1 2( , ,..., )
T
m     be the vector of the experts’ weights, where 0i   is the weight 








 . The overall evaluation value of the expert ke  assigned to the 
expert ie  can be computed as 






 . A larger ( )kiu  value indicates that the 
expert ke  believes the expert ie  is more important, and the deviation value between 
( )k
iu  and 
i  can be calculated as  
2
( )k
i iu  . The total deviation value between 
( )k
iu  and i  for all 
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 . Naturally, we hope that the total deviation value 
is as small as possible. In accordance with this idea, we construct a nonlinear programming model 
to determine the 
1 2( , ,..., )
T



































.                        (10) 
Theorem 1：The optimal solution to model (10) is unique and can be given as follows: 










 ( 1,  2,  ...,  )i m .                   (11) 
The proof of Theorem 1 is included in Appendix A. 
In the CRP, the experts update MMEMs based on the other experts’ performances. Thus, the 
experts’ weights derived from the MMEMs are dynamically changed. 
3.3. Consensus process 
Usually, the consensus process is used to help experts improve the consensus level among the 
experts [1, 9, 34, 52]. There are two key elements in the consensus process: consensus measure 
and feedback adjustment. 
(1) Consensus measure 
Consensus levels are used to measure the current level of consensus in the CRP. Many 
consensus measure methods have been proposed [9, 37, 39]. This section introduces the consensus 
measure method proposed by Palomares et al. [40]. 
The consensus levels are defined at three different levels: pair of alternatives, alternatives, 
and relations. 
1) For each pair of experts ( ke , he ) ( 1,..., 1k m  , 1,...,h k m  ), a similarity matrix, 
( ) ( )( )kh khij n nSM sm  , is defined as 
( ) ( ) ( )1 | |kh k hij ij ijsm p p   .                             (12) 
where 
( ) [0,1]khijsm   is the similarity level between experts ke  and he  in their preference 
values 
( )k





2) A consensus matrix ( )ij n nCM cm  , is computed by aggregating similarity matrices, 
considering the importance weights [0,1]khw   associated to each pair of experts ( , )k he e  
( 1,..., 1,  1,..., )k m h k m    . In the work of Palomares et al. [40], the khw  is computed as 
min( , )kh k hw w w . The element [0,1]ijcm   ( i j ) is the collective consensus level on the 



















.                            (13) 
3) Once the consensus matrix is computed, the consensus levels are computed at three 
different levels:  
(i) Consensus level on a pair of alternatives ( ix , jx ), ij ijcp cm .  













.                                









.                                  (14) 
Obviously, [0,  1]cl . If 1cl  , then all experts are at full consensus. Otherwise, a larger 
cl  value indicates a higher consensus level among experts.  
(2) Feedback adjustment 
Feedback adjustment aims to provide adjustment suggestions to help the experts improve the 
consensus level. Many feedback adjustment methods have been proposed [18, 28, 49]. Here, we 
introduce the feedback adjustment rules to help experts modify their preferences. 
Let 
( ) ( )( )k kij n nP p   ( 1,2,..., )k m  and 
( ) ( )( )c cij n nP p   be as before. Let 




  ( 1,2,..., )k m  be the adjusted preference relation associated with ( )kP . 
When constructing 
( ) ( )[ ]k kij n nP p  , we suggest that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
[min( , ),max( , )],  
1 ,                                       
k k c k c
ij ij ij ij ij
k k
ij ji
p p p p p if i j




.                      (15) 
The detailed consensus process is presented in Algorithm I, which is provided in Appendix B. 
4. Application of the proposed consensus framework to manage non-cooperative 
behaviors 
In this section, we employ the proposed consensus framework to manage non-cooperative 
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behaviors. Specifically, several non-cooperative behaviors are introduced. Then, the detailed 
simulation methods and comparison analysis are designed to justify the validity of the proposed 
consensus framework in managing the non-cooperative behaviors. 
4.1. Non-cooperative behaviors 
The purpose of the CRP is to achieve a high level of agreement before making a decision. 
However, in a real-world CRP, some experts will express their preferences dishonestly or refuse to 
change their preferences to obtain their own interests. In the following, we introduce several 
non-cooperative behaviors. 
(1) Non-cooperative behavior I 
In the CRP, experts need to modify their individual preferences based on the suggestions 
received to achieve a consensus. However, some experts will refuse to change their preferences or 
change their preferences by only a small fraction. In this study, we call this type of behavior 
non-cooperative behavior I.  
Let 
( , ) ( , )( )k z k zij n nP p   ( 1,2,..., )k m  be a preference relation provided by the expert ke  
in consensus round z . 
Let 
( , ) ( , 1) ( , ) ( , 1) ( , 1) ( , 1) ( , 1)
( , )
| |,  [min( , ),max( , )]
       0,                 
k z k z k z k z c z k z c z
ij ij ij ij ij ij ijk z
ij
p p if p p p p p
d
otherwise
      
 

,  (16) 
( , ) ( , )
1 1
n n





 ,                              (17) 
and 




k z k z c z
ij ij
i j
D p p 
 
  ,                           (18) 
where 
( , )k z
ijd  denotes the adjustment amount of expert ke  regarding the pair ( , )i jx x  
according to Eq. (15), 
( , )k zAD  denotes the total adjustment amount of expert ke  regarding all 
of the pairs ( , )i jx x ( , 1,2,..., )i j n , and 
( , )k zD  denotes the total adjustment amount of expert 






















 value represents the degree to which expert ke  modifies his/her preferences 
and moves them closer to consensus, according to the advice received. Clearly, 
( , )
1 [0,1]




k zs  value indicates a higher probability of expert ke , who exhibits non-cooperative 
behavior I. Let   ( [0,1])  be the established threshold. If 
( , )
1
k zs  , we deduce that expert 
ke  satisfies the characteristic of the non-cooperative behavior I in the consensus round z . 























We assume that expert 1e  provides the adjusted preference relation 












Based on Eq. (16), we can obtain that 
(1, )
12 0
zd  , 
(1, )
13 0.03
zd  , 
(1, )
21 0
zd  , 
(1, )
23 0.02
zd  , 
(1, )
31 0.03
zd  , and 
(1, )
32 0.02
zd  . Using Eq. (17) and Eq. (18) yields 
(1, ) 0.1zAD   and 
(1, ) 0.76zD  , respectively. Then, we can obtain that (1, )
1 0.868
zs  , according to Eq. (19). In this 
example, if we set 0.8  , we will deduce that expert 1e  satisfies the characteristic of the 
non-cooperative behavior I because 
(1, )
1
zs  . 
(2) Non-cooperative behavior II 
In the CRP, some experts will express their preferences dishonestly to obtain their own 
interests. A common dishonest behavior is that an expert decreases the evaluation for the 
collective most preferred alternative in the CRP. In this study, we call this type of behavior 
non-cooperative behavior II. 
Let 
( , 1) ( , 1) ( , 1) ( , 1)
1 2( , ,..., )
c z c z c z c z T
nPr pr pr pr
     be the preference vector that derived from 
( , 1)c zP   according to Eq. (6). Let 
( , 1)c z
ox

 be the collective most preferred alternative based on 
( , 1)c zPr  . Using Eq. (4) obtains the preference vector 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 2( , ,..., )
k z k z k z k z T
nPr pr pr pr  
( 1,2,..., )k m  from 




( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 2( ( ), ( ),..., ( ))
k z k z k z k z T
nO o x o x o x                        (20) 
be the preference ordering associated with ke , where 
( , ) ( )k z io x  is the position of the alternative 
ix  in X  according to 
( , )k zPr . For example, if ( , ) (0.3,  0.5,  0.2)k z TPr  , 
( , ) (2,  1,  3)k z TO  . 
Let 
( , ) ( , 1)
( , )
2
1,  ( ) ( )
0,
k z c z





  ,                       (21) 
where the round is the usual rounding  operation and   ( [0,1])   is a parameter. If 
( , )
2 1
k zs  , we deduce that expert ke  satisfies the characteristic of the non-cooperative behavior 
II in the consensus round z . 
Example 2: Let 
(1, 1)zP   and ( , 1)c zP   be as in Example 1. Suppose that expert 1e  
provides his/her adjusted preference relation 












Using Eq. (6) yields the preference vector 
( , 1) (0.5033,  0.4933,  0.4367)c z TPr    from 
( , 1)c zP  . Based on 





  . According to Eq. (4) and Eq. (20), we can 
obtain that 
(1, ) (0.4833,  0.4867,  0.5067)z TPr   and 
(1, ) (3,  2,  1)z TO  , respectively. In this 
example, if we set 0.5  , we will deduce that expert 1e  has the characteristic of the 
non-cooperative behavior II because 
(1, )
2 1
zs  . 
(3) Non-cooperative behavior III 
In the CRP, if there is an expert whose preference always has a significant difference from the 
remainder of the experts, we deduce that this expert has non-cooperative behavior III in this study. 
Let 







k z k z h z
ij ij
h h k i j
s p p
m n n    

 
  .                       (22) 
Clearly, ( , )
3 [0,  1]




Let   ( [0,1])   be the established threshold. If ( , )3
k zs  , we deduce that expert ke  
satisfies the characteristic of non-cooperative behavior III in consensus round z . 
Example 3: Let 























Base on Eq. (22), we can obtain that (1, )
3 0.2167
zs  , (2, )3 0.21
zs   and (3, )3 0.4067
zs  . In 
this example, if we set 0.35  , then we will deduce that expert 3e  satisfies the characteristic 
of the non-cooperative behavior III because (3, )
3
zs  . 
Note 1: The parameters  ,  , and   are used as thresholds to deduce whether experts’ 
behaviors satisfy the characteristics of the non-cooperative behaviors I-III, respectively. Larger  , 
 , and   values indicate the stricter criteria to deduce non-cooperative behaviors I-III, 
respectively. According to the actual situation, the experts can set  ,  , and   values. When 
setting different  ,  , and   values, the proposed consensus framework is effective for 
managing non-cooperative behaviors, as shown in the following simulation experiments and 
comparison analysis. 
4.2. Simulation experiments 
To study whether the proposed consensus framework can manage non-cooperative behaviors, 
this section presents detailed simulation methods. 
In the simulation methods, we randomly generate the initial preference relations and 
MMEMs. The MMEMs involve three attributes: professional skill 1( )a , cooperation 2( )a , and 
fairness 3( )a . There are numerous approaches to set the attribute weights in multiple attribute 
decision making (e.g., [3, 11, 62]). In practical group decision situation, there are different types of 
non-cooperative behaviors, and we don't know which type of non-cooperative behaviors experts 
will use. In our consensus framework each type of non-cooperative behaviors is managed by one 
or more attributes in MMEMs, so we set that the attribute weights are equal to effectively manage 
non-cooperative behaviors. In the following, Simulation methods I-III, which are based on the 
natural hypotheses 1-3, are presented, respectively. 
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Hypothesis 1: If an expert is deduced as using the non-cooperative behavior I, the other 
experts will decrease the evaluation of this expert regarding the attribute “cooperation 2( )a ”. 
Hypothesis 2: If an expert is deduced as using the non-cooperative behavior II, the other 
experts will decrease the evaluation of this expert regarding the attribute “fairness 3( )a ”. 
Hypothesis 3: If an expert is deduced as using the non-cooperative behavior III, the other 
experts will decrease the evaluation of this expert regarding the attributes “professional skill 1( )a ” 
and “cooperation 2( )a ”. 
(1) Simulation experiment I 
The main idea of Simulation method I is that we randomly generate the initial preference 
relations and MMEMs. In the CRP, if expert ke  is deduced as using the non-cooperative 
behavior I, then based on Hypothesis 1, other experts he  ( 1,..., ,  )h m h k   will decrease the 
evaluation of expert ke  regarding the attribute “cooperation 2( )a ”. 
(2) Simulation experiment II 
The basic idea of Simulation method II is similar to Simulation method I. If expert ke  is 
deduced as using the non-cooperative behavior II, based on Hypothesis 2, other experts he  
( 1,..., ,  )h m h k   will decrease the evaluation of expert ke  regarding the attribute 
“fairness 3( )a ”. 
 (3) Simulation experiment III 
The basic idea of Simulation method III is also similar to Simulation method I. If expert ke  
is deduced as using the non-cooperative behavior III, based on Hypothesis 3, other experts he  
( 1,..., ,  )h m h k   will decrease the evaluation of expert ke  regarding the attributes 
“professional skill 1( )a ” and “cooperation 2( )a ”. 
Simulation methods I-III are included in Appendixes C, D and E, respectively.   
Note 2: In Simulation methods I-III, (1) the parameter z  denotes the iteration number to 
achieve a consensus, and the parameter s  reflects whether the predefined consensus level can be 
achieved or not; (2) the parameter   ( [0,  1])   that is used in Steps 5, 5´, and 5" denotes the 
penalty coefficient, and the larger the parameter   value is, the larger the penalty strength will 
be; (3) the parameter r  denotes the number of experts who adopt non-cooperative behaviors, and 
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Steps 6, 6´, and 6" can guarantee that experts 1{ ,..., }re e  have non-cooperative behaviors I-III, 
respectively; (4) we use the OWA operator with the linguistic quantifier “as many as possible” to 
derive the preference vector from a preference relation. 
4.3. Simulation results 
Let max 5z  , and 0.85cl  . When setting different input parameters m , n ,  ,  , and 
r  for Simulation methods I and setting different input parameters m , n ,  ,  , and r  for 
Simulation method II, we run these two simulation methods 1000 times to obtain the average 
values of s  and z . The average s  and z  value, respectively, reflect the success ratio and 
iteration number of achieving the established consensus level in the simulation experiments. The 
average values of s  and z , under different input parameters for Simulation methods I and II, 
are listed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
Table 1: Average values of z  and s  in Simulation method I under different parameters 
   1r   2r   3r   
   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.2   0.4   0.6   
m n   z s z s z s z s z s z s z s z s z s 
5 5 0.5 2.332 1 2.202 1 1.986 1 3.156 1 2.899 1 2.466 1 4.497 0.821 3.912 1 3.368 1 
  0.65 2.421 1 2.300 1 2.132 1 3.321 0.988 3.012 1 2.645 1 4.577 0.712 4.125 0.852 3.801 1 
  0.8 2.625 1 2.432 1 2.211 1 3.413 0.976 3.225 1 2.792 1 4.693 0.645 4.411 0.845 4.055 0.927 
 7 0.5 2.351 1 2.115 1 1.998 1 3.048 1 2.792 1 2.401 1 4.655 0.729 3.757 1 3.580 1 
  0.65 2.461 1 2.222 1 2.106 1 3.201 0.992 3.123 1 2.655 1 4.675 0.681 4.210 0.821 3.715 1 
  0.8 2.656 1 2.442 1 2.323 1 3.322 0.985 3.285 1 2.825 1 4.854 0.589 4.555 0.830 4.275 0.872 
7 5 0.5 1.992 1 1.875 1 1.767 1 2.432 1 2.276 1 1.976 1 2.975 1 2.755 1 2.452 1 
  0.65 2.162 1 1.992 1 1.843 1 2.655 1 2.456 1 2.245 1 3.332 1 3.178 1 2.845 1 
  0.8 2.253 1 2.145 1 2.138 1 2.867 1 2.672 1 2.575 1 3.519 0.995 3.389 1 3.126 1 
 7 0.5 2.002 1 1.864 1 1.705 1 2.295 1 2.001 1 1.977 1 2.967 1 2.701 1 2.554 1 
  0.65 2.156 1 1.997 1 1.854 1 2.489 1 2.247 1 2.012 1 3.290 1 3.079 1 2.799 1 
  0.8 2.345 1 2.152 1 2.028 1 2.755 1 2.557 1 2.452 1 3.501 1 3.312 1 3.099 1 
9 5 0.5 1.967 1 1.743 1 1.684 1 2.245 1 1.989 1 1.879 1 2.675 1 2.345 1 2.201 1 
  0.65 2.002 1 1.878 1 1.701 1 2.379 1 2.224 1 2.078 1 2.804 1 2.654 1 2.476 1 
  0.8 2.084 1 1.921 1 1.798 1 2.516 1 2.398 1 2.275 1 2.931 1 2.828 1 2.719 1 
 7 0.5 1.962 1 1.754 1 1.601 1 2.289 1 1.981 1 1.856 1 2.654 1 2.445 1 2.300 1 
  0.65 1.994 1 1.865 1 1.704 1 2.487 1 2.312 1 2.221 1 2.879 1 2.652 1 2.425 1 
  0.8 2.112 1 1.994 1 1.890 1 2.772 1 2.644 1 2.523 1 3.081 1 2.866 1 2.692 1 
11 5 0.5 2.097 1 1.992 1 1.843 1 2.356 1 2.278 1 1.948 1 2.643 1 2.432 1 2.005 1 
  0.65 2.194 1 2.078 1 1.996 1 2.477 1 2.411 1 2.192 1 2.894 1 2.612 1 2.441 1 
  0.8 2.208 1 2.100 1 2.001 1 2.642 1 2.621 1 2.332 1 3.010 1 2.812 1 2.600 1 
 7 0.5 1.999 1 1.855 1 1.810 1 2.408 1 2.178 1 1.989 1 2.702 1 2.525 1 2.375 1 
  0.65 2.079 1 1.927 1 1.900 1 2.555 1 2.467 1 2.301 1 2.844 1 2.671 1 2.471 1 




Table 2: Average values of z  and s  in Simulation method II under different parameters 
   1r   2r   3r   
   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.2   0.4   0.6   
m n   z s z s z s z s z s z s z s z s z s 
5 6 0.35 2.015 1 1.997 1 1.798 1 3.115 1 2.712 1 2.482 1 4.835 0.337 4.662 0.845 4.518 0.955 
  0.5 2.256 1 2.026 1 1.976 1 3.543 0.984 3.161 1 2.876 1 4.939 0.130 4.756 0.634 4.616 0.823 
  0.65 2.445 1 2.224 1 2.111 1 3.773 0.967 3.312 1 3.001 1 4.998 0.082 4.881 0.316 4.788 0.607 
 8 0.35 2.113 1 1.897 1 1.722 1 3.233 0.989 2.631 1 2.256 1 4.969 0.122 4.621 0.852 4.552 0.942 
  0.5 2.249 1 2.014 1 1.895 1 3.556 0.982 3.182 1 2.878 1 4.988 0.090 4.766 0.515 4.675 0.744 
  0.65 2.398 1 2.156 1 2.078 1 3.786 0.896 3.264 1 2.997 1 4.994 0.060 4.892 0.261 4.765 0.623 
7 6 0.35 2 1 1.998 1 1.993 1 2.559 1 2.453 1 2.309 1 3.67 0.914 3.165 1 2.938 1 
  0.5 2.027 1 2 1 1.995 1 2.645 1 2.528 1 2.402 1 3.72 0.886 3.286 1 3.104 1 
  0.65 2.17 1 2.091 1 2 1 2.786 1 2.655 1 2.513 1 3.976 0.715 3.465 1 3.256 1 
 8 0.35 2.141 1 1.996 1 1.992 1 2.445 1 2.256 1 2.205 1 3.650 0.924 3.156 1 2.742 1 
  0.5 2.214 1 2.152 1 2.002 1 2.625 1 2.545 1 2.301 1 3.741 0.884 3.242 1 3.025 1 
  0.65 2.276 1 2.192 1 2.101 1 2.765 1 2.705 1 2.655 1 3.866 0.794 3.488 1 3.166 1 
9 6 0.35 1.996 1 1.987 1 1.899 1 2.183 1 2.099 1 2.061 1 2.833 1 2.786 1 2.765 1 
  0.5 2.003 1 1.995 1 1.966 1 2.259 1 2.112 1 2.099 1 2.895 1 2.841 1 2.804 1 
  0.65 2.256 1 2.112 1 2.071 1 2.388 1 2.218 1 2.159 1 3.172 1 3.103 1 3 1 
 8 0.35 1.965 1 1.921 1 1.867 1 2.222 1 2.008 1 1.998 1 2.796 1 2.642 1 2.589 1 
  0.5 2.222 1 2.192 1 2.004 1 2.345 1 2.221 1 2.123 1 2.992 1 2.812 1 2.756 1 
  0.65 2.358 1 2.289 1 2.178 1 2.445 1 2.312 1 2.212 1 3.179 1 3.117 1 2.942 1 
11 6 0.35 2.235 1 2.100 1 2.095 1 2.334 1 2.178 1 2.101 1 2.885 1 2.712 1 2.501 1 
  0.5 2.323 1 2.203 1 2.196 1 2.443 1 2.276 1 2.198 1 2.944 1 2.855 1 2.615 1 
  0.65 2.489 1 2.308 1 2.277 1 2.632 1 2.445 1 2.321 1 3.313 1 3.105 1 2.975 1 
 8 0.35 2.188 1 2.065 1 2.021 1 2.324 1 2.201 1 2.092 1 2.787 1 2.521 1 2.388 1 
  0.5 2.413 1 2.234 1 2.189 1 2.524 1 2.300 1 2.240 1 2.888 1 2.744 1 2.687 1 
  0.65 2.499 1 2.295 1 2.208 1 2.678 1 2.512 1 2.368 1 3.258 1 3.189 1 2.946 1 
Let max 5z  , 0.85cl  , and 1r  . When setting different input parameters m ,  , and 
  for Simulation method III, we run this simulation method 1000 times, obtaining the average 
values of s  and z . The obtained average values of s  and z  are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Average values of z  and s  in Simulation method III under different parameters 
    0.2   0.4   0.6       0.2   0.4   0.6   
m n   z s z s z s  m n   z s z s z s 
4 5 0.25 4.566 0.991 3.886 1 3.402 1  7 5 0.25 2.548 1 2.388 1 2.175 1 
  0.35 4.815 0.988 4.067 1 3.612 1    0.35 2.929 1 2.676 1 2.267 1 
  0.45 4.895 0.898 4.210 1 3.823 1    0.45 3.202 1 2.997 1 2.481 1 
 7 0.25 4.440 1 3.788 1 3.271 1   7 0.25 2.606 1 2.293 1 2.006 1 
  0.35 4.796 0.992 3.946 1 3.662 1    0.35 2.866 1 2.495 1 2.285 1 
  0.45 4.897 0.897 4.196 1 3.875 1    0.45 3.292 1 2.886 1 2.553 1 
5 5 0.25 3.652 1 3.286 1 2.578 1  8 5 0.25 2.601 1 2.345 1 2.074 1 
  0.35 3.783 1 3.452 1 2.665 1    0.35 2.747 1 2.512 1 2.215 1 
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  0.45 3.992 1 3.578 1 2.948 1    0.45 3.299 1 2.678 1 2.532 1 
 7 0.25 3.586 1 3.046 1 2.447 1   7 0.25 2.468 1 2.278 1 1.939 1 
  0.35 3.740 1 3.421 1 2.749 1    0.35 2.742 1 2.438 1 2.021 1 
  0.45 4.063 1 3.668 1 2.982 1    0.45 2.911 1 2.718 1 2.253 1 
6 5 0.25 2.723 1 2.348 1 2.102 1  9 5 0.25 2.656 1 2.545 1 2.174 1 
  0.35 3.084 1 2.668 1 2.355 1    0.35 2.767 1 2.678 1 2.305 1 
  0.45 3.346 1 3.005 1 2.411 1    0.45 3.199 1 2.878 1 2.562 1 
 7 0.25 2.589 1 2.259 1 2.003 1   7 0.25 2.768 1 2.478 1 2.239 1 
  0.35 2.642 1 2.402 1 2.208 1    0.35 2.822 1 2.638 1 2.321 1 
  0.45 3.153 1 2.896 1 2.462 1    0.45 3.121 1 2.918 1 2.663 1 
Furthermore, the average z  values in Simulation methods I-III under different parameters 
are depicted in Figs. 2-4, respectively. 
   
(a) 4m  , 5n  , 1r       (b) 6m  , 6n  , 2r         (c) 8m  , 7n  , 3r   
Fig. 2. Average z  values in Simulation method I under different parameters   and   
    
(a) 4m  , 6n  , 1r         (b) 6m  , 7n  , 2r         (c) 8m  , 8n  , 3r   
Fig. 3. Average z  values in Simulation method II under different parameters   and   
   
 (a) 4m  , 5n  , 1r        (b) 6m  , 6n  , 1r         (c) 8m  , 7n  , 1r   
Fig. 4. Average z  values in Simulation method III under different parameters   and   
 
From Tables 1-3 and Figs. 2-4, we have the following observations: 
(1) The proposed consensus framework can manage non-cooperative behaviors I-III when 
setting different parameter values. Generally, it needs an average of 2-3 rounds to achieve a 
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consensus, and it has high consensus success ratios (close to 1) for most cases. 
(2) When the proportion of the experts who adopt non-cooperative behaviors increases to a 
certain level (approximately 30%-40%), the ability to manage non-cooperative behaviors of the 
proposed consensus framework will decrease. 
(3) With decreasing  ,  , and   values or an increasing   value, the average z  
value decreases, and the average s  value increases. This finding implies that adopting the 
relaxed criteria to deduce the non-cooperative behaviors or using the strong penalty strength will 
accelerate the speed to achieve a consensus and will improve the success ratio of achieving a 
consensus.  
4.4. Comparison analysis 
In the proposed consensus framework, the experts’ weights are dynamically updated and 
integrated into the CRP. However, in traditional CRPs, the experts’ weights remain unchanged. In 
the following, we compare the proposed consensus framework with the traditional CRPs. In other 
words, we remove Steps 6, 6´, and 6" from Simulation methods I-III and we obtain Simulation 
methods I´- III´ based on the traditional CRPs, respectively. 
Let 5n  , max 5z  , 0.9cl  , 0.2  , and 2r  . When setting different input 
parameters m  and   for Simulation methods I and I´, we run these two simulation methods 
1000 times, obtaining the average values of s and z . The average values z  and s  under 
Simulation methods I and I´ are described in Fig. 5.  
Let 6n  , max 5z  , 0.9cl  , 0.2  , and 2r  , and set different parameters m  and 
  for Simulation methods II and II´. We run these two simulation methods 1000 times to obtain 
the average values of s  and z . The average values z  and s  under Simulation methods II 
and II´ are described in Fig. 6.  
Let 5n  , max 5z  , 0.9cl  , 0.2  , and 1r  . When setting different input 
parameters m  and   for Simulation methods III and III´, we run these two simulation methods 
III and III´1000 times to obtain the average values of s and z . The average values z  and s  
under Simulation methods III and III´ are described in Fig. 7. In Figs. 5-7, SM is the abbreviation 




Fig. 5. Average z  and s  values in Simulation methods I and I´ under different parameters m  
and   
  
Fig. 6. Average z  and s  values in Simulation methods II and II´ under different parameters 
m  and   
  
Fig. 7. Average z  and s  values in Simulation methods III and III´ under different parameters 
m  and   
From Figs 5-7, we have the following observations: 
(1) There are clearly fewer average consensus rounds in the proposed consensus framework 
than in the traditional CRP. This finding implies that the proposed consensus framework can 
accelerate the speed to achieve a consensus. 
(2) The consensus success ratios in the proposed consensus framework are obviously higher 
than those in the traditional CRP. This finding means that the proposed consensus framework can 
improve the success ratio of achieving a consensus by managing the non-cooperative behaviors.  
5. Illustrative example  
To demonstrate our proposal, let us consider the example presented by Herrera-Viedma et al. 
[28]. In Herrera-Viedma et al.’s example, a set of eight experts 1 2 8{ ,  ,  ...,  }E e e e  provide their 
preferences over a set of six alternatives 1 2 6{ ,  ,  ...,  }X x x x  with different preference 
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representation structures. By using transformation functions, these different preference 
representation structures are transformed into preference relations. These preference relations 
( )kP ( 1,  2,  ...,  8)k   are listed below: 
(1)
0.5 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.8
0.6 0.5 0.7 1 0.8 0.9
0.4 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.7
0.1 0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6













0.5 0.7 0.8 0.6 1 0.9
0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.7
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.6
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.8
0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.4













0.5 0.69 0.12 0.2 0.36 0.9
0.31 0.5 0.06 0.1 0.2 0.8
0.88 0.94 0.5 0.64 0.8 0.98
0.8 0.9 0.36 0.5 0.69 0.97
0.64 0.8 0.2 0.31 0.5 0.94













0.5 0.1 0.36 0.69 0.16 0.26
0.9 0.5 0.84 0.95 0.62 0.76
0.64 0.16 0.5 0.8 0.25 0.39
0.31 0.05 0.2 0.5 0.08 0.14
0.84 0.38 0.75 0.92 0.5 0.66













0.5 0.55 0.45 0.25 0.7 0.3
0.45 0.5 0.7 0.85 0.4 0.8
0.55 0.3 0.5 0.65 0.7 0.6
0.75 0.15 0.35 0.5 0.95 0.6
0.3 0.6 0.3 0.05 0.5 0.85













0.5 0.7 0.75 0.95 0.6 0.85
0.3 0.5 0.55 0.8 0.4 0.65
0.25 0.45 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.45
0.05 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.85 0.4
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.15 0.5 0.75













0.5 0.34 0.25 0.82 0.75 0.87
0.66 0.5 0.25 0.18 0.82 0.91
0.75 0.75 0.5 0.94 0.91 1
0.18 0.82 0.06 0.5 0.34 0.75
0.25 0.18 0.09 0.66 0.5 0.82













0.5 0.13 0.18 0.34 0.75 0.09
0.87 0.5 0.66 0.82 0.91 0.25
0.82 0.34 0.5 0.75 0.87 0.82
0.66 0.18 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.91
0.25 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.5 0.97












In this example, we assume that three attributes, i.e., professional skill 1( )a , cooperation 
2( )a , fairness 3( )a , are used in the MMEMs. The original MMEMs 
( )kV ( 1,  2,  ...,  8)k   that 
the experts provided are listed in Tables 4-5: 













a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3 
e1 null null null  80 89 94  85 93 92  80 92 87 
e2 85 88 94  null null null  85 90 100  85 89 88 
e3 90 96 87  85 92 93  null null null  90 88 89 
e4 80 95 88  90 90 92  80 88 94  null null null 
e5 95 93 86  80 92 91  85 89 85  85 89 90 
e6 85 92 89  80 90 88  85 91 83  80 91 91 
e7 85 91 92  85 90 89  85 87 82  85 92 90 

















a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3 
e1 82 91 90  81 100 97  85 90 91  86 85 84 
e2 85 89 88  87 92 98  86 88 85  85 87 89 
e3 92 92 89  90 93 89  84 89 84  90 84 88 
e4 86 100 86  85 94 84  85 90 82  86 85 91 
e5 null null null  84 89 85  86 92 86  84 84 92 
e6 83 90 92  null null null  90 91 87  91 85 90 
e7 86 88 91  85 88 86  null null null  83 83 88 
e8 91 87 90  90 92 87  88 89 90  null null null 
In this example, let 0.85cl  , 0.2  , 0.8  , 0.5  , and 0.35  . When deriving 
a preference vector from a preference relation, we use the OWA operator with the linguistic 
quantifier “as many as possible”. 
In the following, we use the proposed consensus framework to help experts achieve a 
consensus.  
(1) In the first round, using Eq. (11) obtains the experts’ weights from 
(1) (2) (8){ , ,..., }V V V , 
(0.1252,  0.1256,  0.1263,  0.1248,  0.1244,  0.1245,  0.1233,  0.1259) T  .  
Based on Eq. (14), we obtain that 0.6973cl  .  
The MMEMs in this round are equal to the original MMEMs, i.e., 
( ,1) ( )k kV V  
( 1,2,...,8)k  . 
Using Eq. (5) provides the collective preference relation 
( )cP ,  
( )
0.5 0.4515 0.4385 0.5927 0.6273 0.6212
0.5485 0.5 0.5448 0.6373 0.6185 0.7206
0.5615 0.4552 0.5 0.6969 0.6788 0.6927
0.4073 0.3627 0.3031 0.5 0.6081 0.622
0.3727 0.3815 0.3212 0.3919 0.5 0.7488














( ,1) ( ,1)( )k kij n nP p   ( 1,2,...,8)k  , we suggest that 
( ,1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ,1) ( ,1)
[min( , ),max( , )],   
 1 ,                                     
k k c k c
ij ij ij ij ij
k k
ij ji
p p p p p if i j





Without loss of generality, based on the adjustment suggestions, the experts provided their 
adjusted preference relations 




0.5 0.4043 0.5942 0.8843 0.6997 0.767
0.5957 0.5 0.6711 0.9881 0.7666 0.8715
0.4058 0.3289 0.5 0.7909 0.6041 0.6989
0.1157 0.0119 0.2091 0.5 0.304 0.4341
0.3003 0.2334 0.3959 0.696 0.5 0.6213














0.5 0.6806 0.741 0.5995 0.9393 0.856
0.3194 0.5 0.5944 0.4302 0.7655 0.7018
0.259 0.4056 0.5 0.3688 0.6973 0.6066
0.4005 0.5698 0.6312 0.5 0.8869 0.7768
0.0607 0.2345 0.3027 0.1131 0.5 0.427















0.5 0.6386 0.2129 0.437 0.6178 0.7417
0.3614 0.5 0.4276 0.3325 0.4743 0.7293
0.7871 0.5724 0.5 0.6507 0.7111 0.9219
0.563 0.6675 0.3493 0.5 0.6711 0.7598
0.3822 0.5257 0.2889 0.3289 0.5 0.7559














0.5 0.2588 0.4079 0.5985 0.3076 0.539
0.7412 0.5 0.5818 0.678 0.6186 0.7209
0.5921 0.4182 0.5 0.7645 0.56 0.5508
0.4015 0.322 0.2355 0.5 0.4136 0.201
0.6924 0.3814 0.44 0.5864 0.5 0.6688



















0.5 0.4708 0.4422 0.3584 0.6431 0.3806
0.5292 0.5 0.6539 0.7555 0.4403 0.7375
0.5578 0.3461 0.5 0.6928 0.6938 0.6517
0.6416 0.2445 0.3072 0.5 0.6649 0.6137
0.3569 0.5597 0.3062 0.3351 0.5 0.7661














0.5 0.4699 0.6516 0.7365 0.6269 0.7132
0.5301 0.5 0.5456 0.6994 0.4352 0.7035
0.3484 0.4544 0.5 0.698 0.654 0.5214
0.2635 0.3006 0.302 0.5 0.8095 0.5327
0.3731 0.5648 0.346 0.1905 0.5 0.7492














0.5 0.3801 0.3533 0.7615 0.6794 0.728
0.6199 0.5 0.2572 0.3127 0.6825 0.8444
0.6447 0.7428 0.5 0.9244 0.7847 0.7666
0.2385 0.6873 0.0756 0.5 0.5436 0.7168
0.3206 0.3175 0.2153 0.4564 0.5 0.7563
















0.5 0.1982 0.2055 0.5481 0.6488 0.1769
0.8018 0.5 0.6478 0.7317 0.8233 0.3223
0.7945 0.3522 0.5 0.7256 0.8088 0.6973
0.4519 0.2683 0.2744 0.5 0.7143 0.6567
0.3512 0.1767 0.1912 0.2857 0.5 0.8209














(2) In the second round, using Eq. (11) obtains the experts’ weights from 
(1,1) (2,1) (8,1){ , ,..., }V V V , 1 (0.1252,  0.1256,  0.1263,  0.1248,  0.1244,  0.1245,  0.1233,  0.1259)
T  . 
Based on Eq. (14), we obtain 1 0.8071cl  . 
Using Eq. (19) yields 
(1,1)
1 0.9065s  , 
(2,1)
1 0.8716s  , 
(3,1)
1 0.4361s  , 
(4,1)
1 0.4401s  , 
(5,1)
1 0.5043s  , 
(6,1)
1 0.5038s  , 
(7,1)
1 0.5641s  , and 
(8,1)
1 0.6089s  . Then, Eq. (21) results in 
(1,1)
2 0s  , 
(2,1)
2 0s  , 
(3,1)
2 1s  , 
(4,1)
2 0s  , 
(5,1)
2 0s  , 
(6,1)
2 0s  , 
(7,1)
2 0s  , and 
(8,1)
2 0s  . Next, 
using Eq. (22) provides 
(1,1)
3 0.2033s  , 
(2,1)
3 0.229s  , 
(3,1)
3 0.1877s  , 
(4,1)
3 0.1993s  , 
(5,1)
3 0.1627s  , 
(6,1)
3 0.1609s  , 
(7,1)
3 0.189s  , and 
(8,1)
3 0.2109s  . 
Due to 
(1,1)
1s  , 
(2,1)
1s  , and 
(3,1)
2 1s  , we deduce that experts 1e  and 2e  have the 
characteristic of non-cooperative behavior I and that expert 3e  has the characteristic of 
non-cooperative behavior II. In this situation, we assume that the experts provide the adjusted 
MMEMs 
( ,2)kV  ( 1,2,...,8)k   that are listed in Tables 6-7. 













a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3 
e1 null null null  80 65 94  85 70 92  80 70 87 
e2  85 60 94  null null null  85 68 100  85 65 88 
e3 90 96 60  85 92 70  null null null  90 88 68 
e4 80 95 88  90 90 92  80 88 94  null null null 
e5 95 93 86  80 92 91  85 89 85  85 89 90 
e6 85 92 89  80 90 88  85 91 83  80 91 91 
e7 85 91 92  85 90 89  85 87 82  85 92 90 
e8 80 90 95  80 89 91  90 89 90  92 93 88 













a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3  a1 a2 a3 
e1 82 72 90  81 78 97  85 70 91  86 65 84 
e2 85 64 88  87 72 98  86 68 85  85 65 89 
e3 92 92 67  90 93 70  84 89 65  90 84 67 
e4 86 100 86  85 94 84  85 90 82  86 85 91 
e5 null null null  84 89 85  86 92 86  84 84 92 
e6 83 90 92  null null null  90 91 87  91 85 90 
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e7 86 88 91  85 88 86  null null null  83 83 88 
e8 91 87 90  90 92 87  88 89 90  null null null 
Then, using Eq. (5) yields the collective preference relation 
( ,1)cP ,  
( ,1)
0.5 0.438 0.4511 0.6151 0.6455 0.6127
0.562 0.5 0.5478 0.616 0.626 0.7034
0.5489 0.4522 0.5 0.7014 0.6892 0.6772
0.3849 0.384 0.2986 0.5 0.6263 0.5867
0.3545 0.374 0.3108 0.3737 0.5 0.6955















( ,2) ( ,2)( )k kij n nP p   ( 1,2,...,8)k  , we suggest that 
( ,2) ( ,1) ( ,1) ( ,1) ( ,1)
( ,2) ( ,2)
[min( , ),max( , )],   
 1 ,                                              
k k c k c
ij ij ij ij ij
k k
ij ji
p p p p p if i j





Without loss of generality, based on the adjustment suggestions, the experts provided their 
adjusted preference relations 
( ,2)kP  ( 1,  2,  ...,  8)k   as follows: 
(1,2)
0.5 0.4071 0.5733 0.8422 0.6957 0.744
0.5929 0.5 0.6651 0.9785 0.7603 0.8597
0.4267 0.3349 0.5 0.7743 0.605 0.6963
0.1578 0.0215 0.2257 0.5 0.358 0.4392
0.3043 0.2397 0.395 0.642 0.5 0.6361















0.5 0.5821 0.521 0.6126 0.8973 0.8471
0.4179 0.5 0.5581 0.4722 0.7009 0.703
0.479 0.4419 0.5 0.5222 0.6944 0.6713
0.3874 0.5278 0.4778 0.5 0.8128 0.6965
0.1027 0.2991 0.3056 0.1872 0.5 0.6645














0.5 0.565 0.3615 0.4954 0.64 0.7416
0.435 0.5 0.4429 0.3984 0.4779 0.7191
0.6385 0.5571 0.5 0.6713 0.7086 0.8113
0.5046 0.6016 0.3287 0.5 0.6356 0.663
0.36 0.5221 0.2914 0.3644 0.5 0.703



















0.5 0.2666 0.4378 0.6147 0.4033 0.5489
0.7334 0.5 0.5787 0.6539 0.6252 0.7068
0.5622 0.4213 0.5 0.7232 0.6141 0.5705
0.3853 0.3461 0.2768 0.5 0.5465 0.4859
0.5967 0.3748 0.3859 0.4535 0.5 0.6706
















0.5 0.4628 0.4488 0.5717 0.6435 0.4867
0.5372 0.5 0.6467 0.7325 0.6066 0.7233
0.5512 0.3533 0.5 0.7001 0.6894 0.6743
0.4283 0.2675 0.2999 0.5 0.6277 0.6068
0.3565 0.3934 0.3106 0.3723 0.5 0.7057














0.5 0.4483 0.5316 0.6644 0.6341 0.674
0.5517 0.5 0.546 0.6239 0.4969 0.7035
0.4684 0.454 0.5 0.7005 0.6784 0.6498
0.3356 0.3761 0.2995 0.5 0.68 0.5494
0.3659 0.5031 0.3216 0.32 0.5 0.713



















0.5 0.4123 0.3805 0.7147 0.6534 0.6653
0.5877 0.5 0.4137 0.6135 0.6687 0.8416
0.6195 0.5863 0.5 0.8192 0.6941 0.7449
0.2853 0.3865 0.1808 0.5 0.6145 0.7153
0.3466 0.3313 0.3059 0.3855 0.5 0.7204














0.5 0.248 0.2593 0.5699 0.6458 0.5027
0.752 0.5 0.6021 0.6552 0.7902 0.5329
0.7407 0.3979 0.5 0.723 0.7319 0.6882
0.4301 0.3448 0.277 0.5 0.6811 0.6425
0.3542 0.2098 0.2681 0.3189 0.5 0.7113













 (3) In the third round, using Eq. (11) provides the experts’ weights from 
(1,2) (2,2) (8,2){ , ,..., }V V V , 2 (0.1187,0.1184,0.12,0.1288,0.1283,0.1286,0.1273,0.1298)
T  . 
Based on Eq. (14), we obtain 2 0.8837cl  . The predefined consensus level is achieved. 
Then, using the selection process, we can observe that the collective ranking of alternatives is 
2 3 1 4 5 6x x x x x x . 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we consider the non-cooperative behaviors in the CRP, and propose a novel 
consensus framework to manage non-cooperative behaviors. In this framework, a 
self-management mechanism to generate experts’ weights is devised and then integrated into the 
CRP, in which the experts’ weights are dynamically derived from the MMEMs. The detailed 
simulation experiments and a comparison analysis are presented to show the validity of the 
proposed consensus framework in managing the non-cooperative behaviors. 
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The proposal in this study can provide the decision support to help experts cope with the 
non-cooperative behaviors, and this ability will be key either for an academic conference 
committee attempting to select a best paper or for a science foundation committee that wants to 
find outstanding projects to support. 
Modeling large-scale GDM has become a trend with the development of technology and 
society (e.g., e-democracy [19, 33] and social networks [61]). However, in a large-scale GDM 
context, the experts may feel that it is difficult to provide the MMEMs. We argue that it will be 
interesting in future research to design a self-management mechanism to manage non-cooperative 
behaviors in a large-scale GDM. 
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Appendix A. The Proof of Theorem 1 






( , ) 1
m m m
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i j ij i ij
k i i




    
 
   ,                     (23) 
where   is the Lagrange multiplier. 
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m m l k
j iji k j
w v
m
   
  
  
,                                (27) 
Base on Eq. (7), Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), we have 
( ) ( )
1 1
m mk k
j ij j ij ji i
w v w v w
 
   ; thus, 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
m m l m l m m lk k
j ij j ij ji k j k j i k j
w v w v w m
       
          ,       (28) 
Putting Eq. (28) into Eq. (27), we can obtain 0  . Then, based on Eq. (26), we have  
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 ( 1,  2,  ...,  )i m . 
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. □ 
Appendix B. Algorithm I 
Input: The preference relations 
( ) ( )( )k kij n nP p   ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m , the MMEMs 
( ) ( )( )k kij m lV v   ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m , the weight vector of the attributes 1 2( , ,..., )
T
lw w w w  in the 
MMEMs, the established consensus level cl , and the established maximum number of rounds 
max 1z  . 




  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m , the adjusted 




  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m , and the number of iterations z . 
Step 1: Let 0z  , ( , ) ( )k z kP P , and 
( , ) ( )k z kV V  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m . 
Step 2: Use Eq. (11) to obtain the experts’ weights 
1, 2, ,( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
z z z m z    , where 
 ( , )1 1
,










Step 3: Use Eq. (14) to obtain the consensus level among experts zcl . If zcl cl  
or 
maxz z , go to Step 6; otherwise, continue with the next step. 
Step 4: Expert ke  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m  provides his/her updated MMEM 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij m lV v
 
  based on other experts’ performances. 
Step 5: Use Eq. (5) to obtain the collective preference relation 
( , ) ( , )( )c z c zij n nP p  , where 
( , ) ( , )
,1
mc z k z
ij k z ijk
p p

 . When constructing ( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n nP p
 
  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m , we 
suggest that  
( , 1) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , 1) ( , 1)
[min( , ),max( , )],  
 1 ,                                          
k z k z c z k z c z
ij ij ij ij ij
k z k z
ij ji
p p p p p if i j







Let 1z z  , then go to Step 2. 
Step 6: Let 
( ) ( , )k k zP P  and 
( ) ( , )k k zV V . Output the adjusted preference relations 








  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m , and the number of rounds z . 
Appendix C. Simulation method I 
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Input: m , n , cl , maxz ,  ,   and r . 
Output: s , z . 
Step 1: We randomly generate m  n n  preference relations 
(1) ( ){ ,  ...,  }mP P
 
and m  
m l  MMEMs (1) ( ){ ,  ...,  }mV V . 
Step 2: Let 0z  , ( , ) ( )k z kP P , and 
( , ) ( )k z kV V  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m . 
Step 3: Use Eq. (11) to yield the experts’ weights 
1, 2, ,( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
z z z m z    , where 
 ( , )1 1
,










Step 4: Use Eq. (14) to obtain the consensus level among experts, zcl . If zcl cl  
or 
maxz z , then go to Step 7; otherwise, continue with the next step. 
Step 5: If 0z  , then let 
( , 1) ( , )k z k zV V  ; otherwise, use Eq. (19) to obtain 
( , )
1
i zs ( 1,2,.., )i m . Based on Hypothesis 1, if 
( , )
1
i zs   ( 1)z  , then experts ke  
( 1,2,.., ,  )k m k i   will decrease the evaluation of expert ie  regarding the attribute 
“cooperation 2( )a ”. Without loss of generality, the updated MMEMs 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij m lV v
 
  
( 1,2,.., ,  1)i m z   are provided by using the following method: 
(i) If  j = 1, 3, then let 
( , 1) ( , )k z k z
ij ijv v
  .                                        
(ii) If  j = 2, then let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )
1
( , ) ( , )
1
,  
max( 100 ,0),  
,  
k z k z i z
ij ij
k z i z
ij
null if i k
v v if i k s






    

  
.       
Step 6: Use Eq. (5) to obtain the collective preference relation 
( , ) ( , )( )c z c zij n nP p  , where 
( , ) ( , )
,1
mc z k z
ij k z ijk
p p

 . When constructing ( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n nP p
 
  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m , two 
cases are considered. 
Case A: k r . In this case, expert ke  provides 
( , 1)k zP   as follows: 
For 1,  2,  ...,  i n  and 1,  ...,  j i n  , then let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )(1 )k z k z c zij ij ijp p p 
    , where the 
value of u  is uniformly randomly selected from the interval [0,  1 ] , ( , 1) ( , 1)1k z k zji ijp p
   , 
and 
( , 1) 0.5k ziip
  . 
Case B: r k m  . In this case, expert ke  provides 
( , 1)k zP  , as follows: 
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For 1,  2,  ...,  i n  and 1,  ...,  j i n  , then let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )(1 )k z k z c zij ij ijp p p 
    , where the 
value of u  is uniformly randomly selected from the interval [1 ,  1] , ( , 1) ( , 1)1k z k zji ijp p
   , 
and 
( , 1) 0.5k ziip
  . 
Let 1z z  , then go to Step 3. 
Step 7: If zcl cl , then 1s  ; otherwise 0s  . Output s  and z . 
Appendix D. Simulation method II 
In Simulation method I, we replace Input and Steps 5 and 6 with Input´ and Steps 5´ and 6´, 
respectively, and then obtain a new simulation method: Simulation method II. Input´ and Steps 5´ 
and 6´ are given below:  
Input´: m , n , cl , maxz ,  ,   and r . 
Step 5 ´ : If 0z  , let 
( , 1) ( , )k z k zV V  ; otherwise, use Eq. (21) to obtain 
( , )
2
i zs  
( 1,  2,  ...,  )i m . Based on Hypothesis 2, if 
( , )
2 1
i zs   ( 1)z  , experts ke  
( 1,  2,  ...,  ,  )k m k i   will decrease the evaluation of expert ie  regarding the attribute 
“fairness 3( )a ”. Without loss of generality, the updated MMEMs 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij m lV v
 
  
( 1,  2,  ...,  ,  1)k m z   are provided, as follows: 
(i) if  j =1, 2, let 
( , 1) ( , )k z k z
ij ijv v
  ;                                        
(ii) if  j =3, let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )
2
( , ) ( , )
2
,  
max( 100 ,0),  1
,  0
k z k z i z
ij ij
k z i z
ij
null if i k
v v if i k s




    

  
.                
Step  6´: Use Eq. (5) to obtain the collective preference relation ( , ) ( , )( )c z c zij n nP p  , where 
( , ) ( , )
,1
mc z k z
ij k z ijk
p p

 . Then, use Eq. (6) to obtain the preference vector ( , )c zPr  and the 
collective most preferred alternative 
( , )c z
ox  from 
( , )c zP . When constructing 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n nP p
 
  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m , two cases are considered. 
Case A: k r . In this case, the expert ke  provides 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n nP p
 
  as follows: 
(i) For 1,  2,  ...,  i n , 1,  ...,  j i n  , and ,  i j o , then let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )(1 )k z k z c zij ij ijp p p 
    , where the value of u  is uniformly randomly selected from the 
interval [0.2,1] , 
( , 1) ( , 1)1k z k zji ijp p
   , and 
( , 1) 0.5k ziip
  . 
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(ii) For 1,  2,  ...,  j n  and j o , then let the value of 
( , 1)k z
ojp

 be uniformly randomly 
selected from the interval [0,1] , and 
( , 1) ( , 1)1k z k zjo ojp p
   ; 





  . 
Use Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) to obtain the 
( , 1) ( , 1) ( , 1)
1( ( ),  ...,  ( ))
k z k z k z T
nO o x o x
    and 
( , 1)
2
k zs  , 
respectively. Repeat (ii) until 
( , 1)
2 1
k zs    ( )k r . 
Case B: r k m  . In this case, expert ke  provides 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n nP p
 
  by means of 
For 1,  2,  ...,  i n  and 1,  ...,  j i n  , then let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )(1 )k z k z c zij ij ijp p p 
    , where the 
value of u  is uniformly randomly selected from the interval [1 ,  1] , ( , 1) ( , )1k z k zji ijp p
   , and 
( , 1) 0.5k ziip
  . 
Let 1z z  , then go to Step 3. 
Appendix E. Simulation method III 
In Simulation method I, we replace Input and Steps 5 and 6 with Input" and Steps 5" and 6", 
respectively, and then obtain a new simulation method: Simulation method III. Input" and Steps 
5" and 6" are provided as follows: 
Input": m , n , cl , maxz ,  ,   and r . 
Step 5": If 0z  , let 
( , 1) ( , )k z k zV V  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )i m ; otherwise, use Eq. (22) to provide 
( , )
3
i zs ( 1,  2,  ...,  )i m . Based on Hypothesis 3, if 
( , )
3
i zs   ( 1)z  , experts ke  
( 1,  2,  ...,  ,  )k m k i   will decrease the evaluation of expert ie  regarding the attributes 
“professional skill 1( )a ” and “cooperation 2( )a ”. Without loss of generality, the updated MMEMs 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij m lV v
 
  ( 1,  2,  ...,  ,  1)k m z   are provided, as follows: 
(i) if  j = 3, then let 
( , 1) ( , )k z k z
ij ijv v
  ;                                       
(ii) If j = 1, 2, then let  
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )
3
( , ) ( , )
3
,  
max( 100 ,0),  
,  
k z k z i z
ij ij
k z i z
ij
null if i k
v v if i k s






    

  
.         
Step 6": Use Eq. (5) to obtain the collective preference relation 
( , ) ( , )( )c z c zij n nP p  , where 
( , ) ( , )
,1
mc z k z
ij k z ijk
p p

 . When constructing ( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n nP p
 
  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m , two cases 
are considered. 
Case A: 1k r  . In this case, expert ke  provides 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n nP p
 
  as follows: for 
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1, 2,  ...,  i n  and 1,  ...,  j i n  , then let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )(1 )k z k z c zij ij ijp p p 
    , where the value of 
u  is uniformly randomly selected from the interval [0.2,  1] , ( , 1) ( , 1)1k z k zji ijp p
   , and 
( , 1) 0.5k ziip
  . 
Case B: 1k r  . In this case, expert 1e  provides 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n nP p
 
  as follows: for 
1,  2,  ...,  i n  and 1,  ...,  j i n  , then let the value of 
( , 1)k z
ijp

 be uniformly randomly selected 
from the interval [0,  1] , 
( , 1) ( , 1)1k z k zji ijp p
   , and ( , 1) 0.5k ziip
  . 
Use the Eq. (22) to obtain the 
( , )
3
k zs . Repeat this process until ( , )
3
k zs   ( 1)k r  . 
Let 1z z  , then go to Step 3. 
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